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ABSTRACT
The subject of the thesis are the major philosophical and legal, as well as 
aspects of practical application of the concept of humanitarian intervention.
Through historical and legal analysis the study tests a question whether there 
is a place for humanitarian intervention concept within contemporary international 
system.
Crimes against humanity are nothing new. Despite a juridical presumption 
that human rights are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. It has 
became understood, since the post-Cold War era, that prevention and prosecution, 
as well as, definition of human rights, are matters of international concern and 
international competence.
However, the contemporary international law strictly stands against any 
erosion of the limits of the principles of non use of force and non-intervention and 
consequently rejects the existence of the considered concept.
Moreover, what is lacking is, any measure of how extensive a crime has to 
be before it passes from domestic to international jurisdiction.
Another issue is what kind of procedures and mechanisms for taking 
action, diplomatic or judicial or military should be undertaken by the international 
community in order to stop human rights violation.
The analysis leads to a conclusion that humanitarian intervention concept
has a right for existence , at least, for ad hoc application, but in every case should 
be put under a strict standards elaborated in theoretical literature and international 
practice.
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Analytical Framework
1.2 The Scope and Objective of the Thesis
II. THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE ON HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION
2.1 Ambiguity of the Concept
2.2 Early Implementation of the Concept
2.3 The United Nations Era
III.HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST
3.1 Prohibition of the Use of Force under International Law
3.2 The Problem of Legitimization
3.3 Permissible Standards of Humanitarian Intervention
IV. CONCLUSION
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY
HI
INTRODUCTION
I . I Analytical Framework
The concept of humanitarian intervention was first put forward by Hugo 
Grotious in his famous De Jure Belli Ac Pads Libri Tres in the first half of the 
seventeenth century. Throughout its historical perspective the concept has been 
treated according to the new demands and features of every epoch. The post-Cold 
War era has introduced to the international agenda a necessity to revise old 
approaches or, at least, to increase the awareness of the public and scholars toward 
the concept of humanitarian intervention.
One of the central concerns of civilization today has become humanitarian 
values, particularly human rights. The challenge is being felt not only at the 
national level, where institutions of society are more fully developed, but also at 
the international level. The international community has to face the issue of 
contributing to the effective enjoyment of human rights. A question is whether 
there should be a more persuasive international response to gross violations of 
human rights, including the development of the international capacity to intervene 
in matters-traditionally excluded from the United Nations competence by norms
of the UN Charter. In other words, one of the important features of the 
contemporary international scene is the internationalization of human rights. New 
demands concerning human rights issues lead to a necessity of changing and 
revising the ideology, normative rules and structure of international relations in 
accordance with them. Moreover contemporary global changes have given to the 
world a chance to unify the efforts of states with the purposes of promoting and 
enhancing humanitarian values.
Three factors should be especially mentioned here. With the demise of 
Communism the character of the international system has changed fundamentally. 
A rigid polar system does not exist any more. Under these conditions, international 
co-operation has become a feasible means of solving a great number of problems 
and difficulties which face humanity . Secondly, the creation in 1945 of the United 
Nations is now being understood as a great step in human history towards ensuring 
international peace, security and development. With the departure from 
confrontation between great powers it has become possible to realize the unifying 
potential of the global organization. The overall activity of the organization in the 
last few years is reliable evidence of this.
The third factor does not have such a tangible character as the previous two. 
An analysis of the international practice of states and international organizations, 
(and analysis of international treaties and resolutions of international organizations, 
statements of politicians and the studies of scholars) gives an impression that the
international community is heavily concerned with the issue of promoting 
humanitarian values. More often states in their activities are guided not only by 
considerations of national interest, but also by humanitarian considerations.
However, while the debates on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention 
undertaken by one state or a group of states had intensive character , attempts to 
resolve a debate over a place of humanitarian intervention concept within existing 
legal system were few in number. Consequently, a necessity of a comprehensive 
analysis of humanitarian intervention concept from the point of view of theoretical 
identification, legitimization, and practical implementation has been put forward.
1.2 Scope and Objective of the Thesis
Following this short review of the latest global changes taking place in the 
world, the main research questions have been posed for further inquiry:
- the definition of "intervention" as a concept
- the definition of the term "humanitarian"
- what are the proper grounds for humanitarian intervention
- who can justifiably intervene with humanitarian motives
- what are the most appropriate means of forcible promotion of human
rights.
In order to elaborate the given questions the thesis attempts:
- to analyze the evolution of the concept of humanitarian intervention from 
a historical perspective: from Hugo Grotius to the post-Cold War era;
- to re-consider, from a contemporary point of view, notions such as 
"sovereignty", "domesticjurisdiction", "intervention" and "non-intervention" with 
the purpose of facing the dilemma: "sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction" versus 
"international intervention";
- to analyze the norms of contemporary international law concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force as well as the norms of non-intervention;
- to critically analyze the question of legitimization of humanitarian 
intervention on the basis of contemporary international law;
- to make a brief survey of the international practice of humanitarian 
intervention;
to analyze the permissible forms of humanitarian intervention in order 
to formulate practical recommendations.
It should also be pointed out that the main focus of the study will primarily 
be on the legal aspects of the issue, with an attempt to analyze the arguments and 
counter-arguments on the basis of the United Nations Charter, the fundamental 
principles of contemporary international law, international treaties and resolutions 
of international organizations. Moreover, due to the philosophical and political 
aspects of humanitarian intervention, the thesis will also necessarily consider the 
main philosophical and political theories concerning the concept.
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE ON HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
2.1 Ambiguity of the Concept
An inquiry into the concept of humanitarian intervention can not be useful 
without consideration of some definitions of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, 
an analysis of these definitions will help to outline the necessary framework of the 
thesis and to focus on the most important elements of the concept.
Establishing a sole and unchallengeable definition of such a notion as 
humanitarian intervention is not an easy task for scholars. In spite of the fact that 
the concept of humanitarian intervention has had a long history and attention from 
the most outstanding thinkers, there is still not a commonly-recognized definition. 
Moreover, there is a broad methodological spectrum in identifying the notion in 
the related theoretical literature . Thus, it is necessary to give a general picture of 
the existing methodological approaches. Some authors define this notion in purely 
political terms, leaving aside the legal aspects and the international context. Louis 
Henkin lists the alleged exceptions to Article 2(4) encountered in practice:
- humanitarian intervention
- intervention to support self-determination
- intervention for socialism (the Brezhnev Doctrine)
- intervention for democracy (the Reagan Doctrine).'
Although, it is undoubtedly interesting and useful from the viewpoint of 
understanding the foreign policies of the two great powers during the Cold War 
era, this approach is not adequate from the methodological point of view. More 
precisely, the given political classification does not focus on the humanitarian 
aspect, which in the widely recognized context means "devoted to the commonly 
recognized values of mankind". Rather, this classification represents the notion as 
something contradictory, that actually serves the narrow political interests of the
users.
For example, lacking justification under contemporary international law, the 
intervention of the USSR and other socialist states in Czechoslovakia, was not 
represented by the socialist bloc as a case of aggression. This, however was 
justified as a case of an intervention for socialism, which, according to them, had 
a sufficiently high value to justify intervention: "Discharging their internationalist 
duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own 
socialist gains, the USSR and the other socialist states had to act decisively."'
On the other hand, similar to the use of force to impose or maintain 
socialism or any other ideology, the use of force for democracy clearly would have 
a dual nature, leading to abuses in the international arena and, would be contrary
to the spirit and letter of Article 2(4).
In terms of another approach, the nature of humanitarian intervention is 
considered as giving extensive interpretation to the concept of intervention. It 
would be necessary to include under the term of humanitarian intervention quite 
a l-ong array of humanitarian activity by states, non-governmental, and 
governmental international organizations and even by private persons with the 
main objective of humanitarian assistance (without elements of forcible coercion, 
which is an element of the notion intervention).
Some authors analyzing the conditions of the UN intervention in intra-state 
conflict consider that the notion of intervention will not be limited to its technical 
definition in the sense of "dictatorial interference". It will be defined as any action 
taken by the UN to regulate or to solve an intra-state conflict.·’
Considering the issue, Brownlie urges that the diplomatic usage of the term 
"humanitarian intervention" should not be confused with other usages, According 
to him, in diplomatic usage the term has been used more widely to describe 
diplomatic intervention on behalf of non-nationals in matters which are within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the host state.’
There is also a confusion surrounding the term intervention in the theoretical 
literature. Foremost, humanitarian intervention must be distinguished from other 
concepts that contain the notion of intervention and carry humanitarian motives to 
some extent - intervention to protect nationals or intervention to facilitate self­
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determination. While intervention to protect nationals suggests humanitarian 
motives, the notion of humanitarian intervention has distinct meanings in 
international legal and political considerations. Humanitarian intervention involves 
the use of force by a state to protect the citizens of another state from threatening 
situations within their own state.“' Intervention to facilitate self-determination, on 
the other hand, involves a state’s armed intervention on behalf of a self- 
determination movement within the target state. "The purposes of humanitarian 
intervention are not the creation of a new state per se, but only the protection of 
peoples within an existing state.
Furthermore, despite its broad usage the concept of intervention has not 
been clearly identified in international law. The principle of non-intervention was 
placed among the fundamental principles of international law but, in comparison 
to other fundamental principles, it has not been codified into a clear set of 
rules. In an age of state interconnectedness, feven interdependence, characterized 
by considerable influence across borders), it has thus far proven difficult to 
identify, in a set of comprehensive rules, the difference between permissible 
influence and impermissible interference and intervention.^ As a result, the 
principle of non-intervention is interpreted in a quite different manner, which, as 
a rule, depends on the particular interests of the interpreting states. Thus, there can 
be found, in the contemporary norms of non-intervention, several prohibitions not 
just against forcible interference but against non-forcible interference.*
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Less restrictive interpretations of the principle have been made by the more 
powerful states. These states have got more impetuses and motives for intervention 
such as hegemonic ambition; concerns about regional stability; ethnic sympathy for 
oppressed groups; and a sense of international responsibility, perhaps allied to 
some notion of world order or regional order.
Thus, the overview of the literature on the subject gives the initial 
impression that the concept can be correctly defined if the construction of the 
notion words "intervention" and "humanitarian" are interpreted more precisely. 
Following this logic, a definition given by Brownlie seems to be the most 
appropriate : "humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of armed force by a 
state, a belligerent community or international organization with the objective to 
protect human rights.""’ One of the strongest elements of this definition is that the 
author points out who can intervene to protect human rights. Previous authors have 
considered humanitarian intervention only by a state, and consequently 
humanitarian intervention was left to the domain of unilateral action, missing the 
domain of multilateral action.
It seems that the definition has some serious shortcomings. For example, 
the interpretation of the word "humanitarian" is too ambiguous. The question is 
what does the protection of human rights mean? The point is that this sentence can 
be interpreted in such a way that it would cover too long an array of probable 
human rights violations, starting, for example, with a simple limitation by a state
of the rights of the trade unions to the massacre of the civilian population.
In the search for a definition of humanitarian intervention arises a question 
as to the proper grounds for humanitarian intervention. Particularly, as it is stated 
that "humanitarian intervention is an interference in the internal affairs of another 
state in order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic human rights of 
foreign nationals by their government.""
Felix Oppenheim gave an apparent approbation to intervention when a state 
renders itself guilty of cruelties against and the persecution of its nationals in such 
a way as "to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of 
mankind.'"- Obviously, this definition is an example of an attempt to find out 
some criteria of human rights violations that can justify intervention. Anthony 
D’Amato has found out other three cases justifying humanitarian intervention: 
genocide, slavery, and widespread torture. However, the report of Amnesty 
International and other highly credible organizations engaged in the defence of 
human rights document widespread torture in a large number of countries that 
were left without any considerable response of international community.'^
Review of the literature on the subject has illustrated that there is no 
unanimity of approach in the identification of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention. As it has been argued above, each definition of the notion clarifies 
only one or two aspects of the whole concept even considering notions that have 
little in common with humanitarian intervention. Probably, the main reason for this
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is that the concept does not raise strong interest with jurists and politicians. This 
may be due to a fear of the necessity to revise the fundamental elements of what 
has been established through the UN Charter and the contemporary international 
legal system.
The next hurdle is that the authors have to deal with a concept whose 
elements are unmeasurable. If we follow the definition by Oppenheim and his 
criteria on humanitarian intervention - "cruelties and persecution of its nationals 
(by a government) that can shock the conscience of mankind" - it is reasonable 
to ask who would establish, how it would be established, and whether there are 
human rights violations that shock "the conscience of mankind" or not.
In any event, an analysis of the existing definitions of the concept is highly 
useful, showing directions for further inquiry into the concept.
2.2 Early Implementation of the Concept
Although the notion of humanitarian intervention has been formulated only 
since 1945, it has a long history. However, it is difficult to point to any particular 
historical case that could be identified as the first implementation of the concept 
in state practice. Ian Brownlie puts forward the occupation by France of some 
parts of Syria and the patrolling of Syria’s coastline by French military ships 
between August 1860 and June 1861 as an example of a state action whose main
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motive was humanitarian concern. The French action was done with the purpose 
of preventing the recurrence of massacres of Maronite Christians.
However, the theoretical elaboration of the concept was considered much 
earlier. The appearance of the concept of humanitarian intervention, as a 
wellfounded concept, is connected with the name of Grotius. Grotius rejected the 
approach of achieving state objectives through military means in the international 
arena, arguing that states should achieve their objectives using peaceful methods. 
According to him, war was not the appropriate method for the settlement of 
political and social problems.
Grotius put special emphasis on the necessity of adhering to rules 
(concerning force) in relations among states.’·' Thus, wars were classified into two 
groups: just and unjust wars. The first kind was acceptable, the second was not. 
Grotius, using the legacy and statements of ancient thinkers, jurists and religious 
authorities, considered and formulated a great number of criteria for the political 
and legal evaluation of international armed conflicts.’^
However, for the purposes of this thesis, the interesting issue (considered 
by Grotius) is the one concerned with the elaboration of the principles of 
humanitarian intervention. Hersch Lauterpacht asserts that Grotius’ writings 
contained "the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian 
intervention - the principle that exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when 
outrage upon humanity begins."” Thus, it can be said that a discussion over a
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dilemma - "sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction" versus "international concern" 
was initially opened by Grotius.
In order to clarify some of his main ideas on humanitarian intervention, it 
is necessary to look at Chapter XXV of Book 2 of De Jure Belli Ac Pads Libri 
Tres (1625), entitled "On the Causes Of Undertaking War on Behalf of Others". 
Article 2 of the chapter proclaims that "The first and the most necessary concern 
should be about of either patriarchal or civil authority... Thus, the author 
accepts and to some extend confirms the concept of supremacy of a state’s 
authority in cases that are within domestic jurisdiction of a state, particularly the 
power over its subjects. However, in article 8, Grotius turns to the question of 
"whether there may be a just cause of undertaking war on behalf of the subjects 
of another ruler, in order to protect them from wrong at his h a n d s . I n  
principle, Grotius recognizes that individuals are subject to the jurisdiction and the 
power of punishment of their states. Nevertheless, he asserts that: "If the wrong 
is obvious and some tyrant should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as no 
one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of their right vested in human society 
is not precluded and other states may take up arms to help the persecuted."“'^
Grotius cited the example that "Roman emperors took up arms against 
Persians or threatened to take up arms if they did not stop persecution upon 
Christians. "“’ Despite this approach, Grotius supported the idea of placing strict 
limitations on just causes for undertaking war. Though plainly aware of the ever­
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present potential for abuse, he insisted that occasional abuses did not render the 
right of intervention invalid:
"Hence, Seneka thinks that I may make war upon one who is no one of 
my'people but oppressed his own,... a procedure which is often connected with 
the protection of innocent persons. We know, it is true, from both ancient and 
modern history, that the desire for what is anothers seeks such pretexts as this for 
its own ends; but a right does not at once cease to exist in case it is to some 
extent abuses by evil men. Pirates, also sail the sea, arms are carried also by 
brigands."-'
Thus, long before the beginning of the present century, there were examples 
in state practice and written doctrines of a claimed right of humanitarian 
intervention to protect oppressed populations, particularly where the oppression 
was characterized by widespread killing. Most of the interventions in question 
involved the protection of the Christian population in the eastern Mediterranean 
from alleged oppression by Ottoman rulers. Brownlie refers to the Ottoman 
treatment of Christians and the Russian treatment of Jews as instances leading to 
diplomatic intervention.-·’
The basis for the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
is far from being clear. It was more a response triggered by a humanitarian 
impulse to alleviate human suffering than an attempt to uphold individual rights 
against oppressive state au th o ritie s .N o  doubt an important condition for the
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justification of the doctrine resided in the fact that, before the 1928 Pact of Paris 
(Kellog-Briand Pact) the law did not, in any event, prohibit unilateral resort to war 
as a means for settling disputes between states.
Meanwhile, the extent to which the interventions were free from challenge 
on their own moral-legal ground has been questioned. According to Nigel Rodley, 
in many cases, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was only used as 
justification when it coincided with the interests of the states involved. That is to 
say, since humanitarian intervention can only involve certain minorities and 
powers in certain situations, it usually took place when it was in the interests of 
the powerful players. There were similar situations where intervention did not take 
place when it was not in the interests of the powerful players.
2.3 The United Nations Era
It has been said that the period of the United Nations is somewhat lacking 
in the practice of humanitarian intervention (the recent examples of humanitarian 
intervention will be considered later). Only a small number of historical cases such 
as intervention in Uganda (1979), Central Africa (1979), and Grenada (1983), can 
be considered as examples of humanitarian intervention.
Case I; Uganda (1979)
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On April 11, 1979, forces from the Ugandan National Liberation Front 
(UNLF) entered Uganda’s capital city of Kampala and formed a provisional 
government headed by Professor Yusuk Lule. The rebel action was accomplished 
with the direct participation of thousands of Tanzanian troops and ended eight 
years of brutal dictatorship by Uganda’s president, Idi Amin. Under the Amin 
regime, perhaps as many as three hundred thousand Ugandan citizens had been 
killed, many after having suffered grisly torture.
There are various interpretations of the real motives of the Tanzanian 
leadership in this intervention. Tanzania’s 1979 use of force against Uganda was 
the result of a series of events that took place in circumstances of strained 
relations between the two nations over the preceding years. One of the most 
formative factors of these strains was perhaps Uganda’s armed attack of Tanzania 
in October, 1978. In the wake of its invasion from the north, Uganda briefly 
occupied the Kagera Salient - a part of Tanzanian territory and advanced territorial 
claims upon the area.
However, by January 1979 it has became obvious that Tanzania achieved 
decisive success on the battlefield. The Tanzanian government was clearly 
determined to topple Idi Amin from power. It should be mentioned that UNLF, 
claimed to be a decisive force opposing the Amin regime, was actually established 
in March 1979 when the Amin regime was already heavily shaken by Tanzanian 
troops. In these circumstances, "the Security Council might appropriately have
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become more involved in appraising the situation in Uganda, which was one that 
threatened international peace and security. The Council might have taken 
decisions aimed at preserving the peace by sanctioning Uganda for its endemic 
lawlessness, and among other things it might have approved the course of action 
that Tanzania took unilaterally to remove Adi Amin from power. Following 
such complicated events preceding the Tanzanian intervention it is difficult to 
identify the character of this intervention. Natalino Ronzitti observes:
" Humanitarian justification would seem, then, to have been totally lacking 
in the Tanzanian intervention. According to the most prevailing opinion, the sole 
aim of Tanzania’s military action was the limited one of reacting against the armed 
attack carried out by Uganda, and not that of overthrowing the Amin regime, 
which was the task of the Ugandan rebels.
In Fernando Teson’s view, the Uganda incursion represents "a precedent 
supporting the legality of humanitarian intervention in appropriate cases". More 
fundamentally, it constitutes "perhaps the clearest in a series of cases which have 
carved out an important exception to the prohibition of article 2(4)."·'^
In the context of the Tanzanian government statements, according to which 
the purpose of Tanzania’s use of force was not limited to protecting human rights, 
the 1979 intervention can hardly be recognized as a purely humanitarian 
intervention
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Case 2: Central Africa (1979)
On September 21, 1979, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the so-called "Emperor" of 
the Central African Empire, was overthrown in a bloodless coup. Bokassa’s 
deposition, brought about while he was away in Libya, was facilitated by the 
active support of 8 00  French commandoes. In Teson’s opinion, humanitarian 
concerns were crucial to the French decision to overthrow Bokassa. French troops 
provided just the necessary amount of help to Central African citizens needed to 
depose the dictator who had undoubtedly rendered himself guilty of the gravest 
crimes against humanity.
During his fourteen years as dictator Bokassa committed a number of 
atrocities. In April 1979, for example, he personally ordered the torture and 
murder of 2 0 0  children after they refused to purchase government-mandated 
school uniforms. Following this and other examples it can be concluded that the 
human rights violations in Central Africa were sufficiently broad to Justify, at least 
from the point of view of morality, humanitarian intervention.
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck have put forward some arguments against 
the humanitarian character of this intervention: firstly, they state that "the scope 
of the human rights violations committed by the Bokassa regime seems to have 
been insufficiently broad to have justified a humanitarian intervention "(this 
argument clearly indicates how difficult it is to set up justifiable limits for 
humanitarian intervention). Secondly, there is some cause to question the purity
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of France’s humanitarian motives. The French government never invoked, for 
example, a humanitarian intervention justification for its action.’”
At the beginning of the intervention, French government even refused to 
recognize participation of French troops. Moreover, substantial French economic 
interests in Central Africa should be taken into account, as well as the objective 
of protecting its access to Central Africa’s diamonds, uranium, and other strategic 
minerals. Thus, the real motives of the French intervention are difficult to assess, 
but in any event it surely was a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Case 3: Grenada (1983)
One of the most controversial, in terms of its motives and the hot discussion 
it caused around the world, was the intervention by US troops in Grenada. For the 
opponents of the concept of humanitarian intervention, the intervention of Grenada 
is a classic example of a situation where a state uses the concept as a shield in 
order to justify its self-centered and illegal claims. Thus, the United Nations 
regarded the invasion as an act of aggression, as a gross violation of international 
law. and as encroachment on Grenada’s independence and sovereignty. One 
hundred and eight member states voted for the resolution of the General Assembly 
that condemned the aggression and demanded an immediate withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Grenada.·’’
The intervention began on October 25, 1983, four days after the initial
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landing, all resistance by the People’s Revolutionary Army of Grenada was 
neutralized. Among the main motives of the US intervention, it is possible to 
isolate four major arguments upon which the US purported to act in Grenada:
- protection of nationals abroad
- collective action under a regional arrangement or agency
- invitation by a lawful authority
- protection of human rights and restoration of law and order and democratic
institutions 32
The intervening Caribbean states relied on differing grounds to justify the 
legality of the Grenada intervention, but five major arguments can be identified:
- invitation by a lawful authority
- anticipatory self-defence
- maintenance of peace and security under a regional arrangement or agency
- protection of nationals abroad
- intervention for humanitarian purposes.·^’
Although the initial justifications for the military intervention in Grenada, 
put forward by President Reagan and Jeane Kirkpatrick, were characterized by 
their humanitarian overtones, the position of the US leadership can be heavily 
criticized on this point.
Firstly, the US leadership’s references to humanitarian reasons as a motive 
and justification for intervention were changed during the time of the intervention
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and post-intervention period.This happened because it became clear that there were 
more reliable and persuasive justifications, such as, for example, an invitation by 
a lawful authority; in this case it was an invitation by Grenada’s Governor-General 
Sir Paul Scoon. Secondly, the character of the intervention and the position of the 
US .leadership clearly indicated the presence of strong geopolitical motives for the 
intervention.
Finally, the humanitarian motives for intervention can be heavily criticized 
in terms of human rights violations in Grenada since they were not at a level that 
would represent a real threat of widespread loss of human life. Therefore, there 
was not a necessity for outside intervention.
On the basis of the short analysis of the given historical cases, four 
concluding points can be made: The concept of humanitarian intervention, despite 
its weak significance, has been interpreted and implemented quite differently since 
the founding of the United Nations. Particularly, the precise understanding and 
interpretation of the concept during the Cold War era was reflected through 
various ideological doctrines. (The main objective during the Cold War, however, 
was to broaden the limits of the principle of non-intervention in order to fulfil 
geopolitical intentions in the international arena). The Reagan Doctrine and the 
Doctrine of "socialist internationalism" (it has also been called the Brezhnev 
Doctrine but the founder of this doctrine was actually V.l.Lenin) are two such 
doctrines which should be mentioned especially.
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Reagan Doctrine can be presented as an assertion of an American right to 
aid "freedom fighters."'·* It was presumed that the USA had a right to promote 
democracy (in its own understanding) everywhere in the world (especially in so- 
called "areas of the vital interest" for the USA) even through military intervention 
if it seemed necessary.
As to the Brezhnev doctrine, it should be said that the roots of this doctrine 
lie in the concept of "permanent revolution" by Lenin and L.Trotsky. According 
to this concept, after the victory of proletarian revolution in one country, the 
process should not be stopped. Rather, it should extend to other countries with the 
purpose of "liberating" the working class from the "oppression" of the 
bourgeoisie.'·'' The Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia 
(1968), and the threat of intervention in Poland (1982), in order to protect 
"socialist values", are direct outcomes of the doctrine.
Secondly, cases of genuine, non-structural humanitarian action have 
occurred in the contemporary era without major political or commercial 
motivations, although they have been few in number historically. Thirdly, in some 
of these operations, the beneficiaries of intervention were very mixed, comprising 
both nationals and non-nationals of the intervening state. This, of course, makes 
it difficult to separate claims to humanitarian intervention from extended self- 
defence. Fourthly, in none of these cases (except, probably the intervention of 
Grenada) was an intervening state formally censored by the international
22
community for the action.
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST
3.1 Prohibition of the Use of Force Under International Law
Particular importance in the focus of the thesis is represented by an analysis 
of rule relating to the use of force, especially, prohibition of the use force. The 
rule relating to the use of force has got a long and contradictory history. Drawing 
on the work of John Norton Moore, six rough historical periods can be identified: 
1) the Just War period; 2) the positive period; 3) the League of Nations period; 
4) the Kellog-Briand Pact period; 5) the United Nations Charter period; 6) the 
post-United Nations Charter period.'
Taking into account that the main interest of the thesis is the role of 
humanitarian intervention within contemporary international legal system, it is 
reasonable to concentrate on the United Nations period. The most important 
provisions of the UN Charter on the recourse to force is article 2, paragraph 4, 
which is contained in Chapter 1, entitled "Purposes and Principles". Article 2 (4) 
provides;
All members (of the UN) shall refrain in their international relations from
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the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.
In addition. Article 2 (6) provides that:
The organization shall ensure that all states which are not Members of the 
United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of peace and security.
Thus, with some clearly defined exceptions (for example. Article 51), a set 
of imperative norms was established for a general prohibition of the use of force.
Another fundamental principle of international law that, together with the 
principle of non-use offeree, is directly concerned with humanitarian intervention 
is the principle of non-intervention, which is broadly formulated in Article 2(7) in 
the following:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter.
Humanitarian intervention as a concept contains elements from both of these 
principles: the use of force and interference in the domestic affairs of a state. In 
order to establish any arguments in favor or against humanitarian intervention, it 
first seems necessary to find out all exceptions to the principle of the non-use of
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force so as to determine whether there is a place for humanitarian intervention 
among these exceptions. And, to find out to what extent the concept contradicts 
the principle of non-intervention.
An analysis of the provisions of the UN Charter and other sources of 
international law points to six generally recognized exceptions to the principle of 
non-use of force. These are:
- the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter;
- enforcement actions by the UN under authorization of the Security Council 
(Chapter VII);
- authorization given by the Security Council to regional organizations 
(Chapter VIII);
- use of force against ex-enemy states (Articles 53 and 107);
- treaties of guarantee and the use of force by invitation.
Thus, having a complete array of exceptions to the principle of non-use of 
force and taking into account the strict limits for any kind of interpretation under 
the principle of non-intervention, an analysis of the legitimacy of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention within the contemporary international system might be 
attempted.
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3.2 The Problem of Legitimization
It would be misleading to state that the scholarly discussion over the concept 
of humanitarian intervention has got an intense and controversial character. Only 
a modest number of prominent scholars have argued that states may lawfully 
undertake humanitarian intervention.' Notwithstanding the opinion of these 
authorities, the majority of scholars and the majority of states appear to follow the 
"restrictionist view" which posits that such intervention is not permissible.
Three basic premises underlie the "restrictionist view". First, the viewpoint 
maintains that the fundamental objective of the UN system is the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Second, it holds that, except in clear cases of 
state self-defence, the UN has a monopoly on the legitimate recourse to force. 
Third, it contends that if states were permitted to take recourse to armed coercion 
for any purpose other than individual or collective self-defence, they would be 
merely provided with a ready pretext for geopolitical intervention.·^
Despite the heavy burden of defending humanitarian intervention the 
opponents of the "restrictionist view" have put forward a few elaborate arguments 
in favor of humanitarian intervention. Arend and Beck have found such 
arguments as: the protection of human rights; the revival of the customary right 
of humanitarian intervention; permissible force below the 2(4) threshold.·  ^ Other
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arguments have been mentioned in the International Law Association sub­
committee Report, where it was asserted that the United Nations can intervene if 
the state violating human rights causes an actual threat to the peace.“’
Furthermore, intervention may be lawful, in the sense of "not prohibited", 
in areas outside of national, i.e. exclusive territorial jurisdiction. Thus, 
intervention may be lawful to prevent atrocities by insurgents, pirates, terrorists 
and others not acting on behalf of a state or organization of states, in control of 
ships, aircraft or spacecraft, on or over the high seas, in space or over Antarctica 
or areas under a similar regime.^
Donelly has added another argument - considerations of morality. 
Particularly, he asserts that morality provides the strongest justification for 
humanitarian intervention.’ Further inquiry into this problem will be devoted to 
an analysis and elaboration of the enumerated arguments. It seems reasonable to 
begin the analysis with the argument over the protection of human riglits. It has 
been noted earlier that the United Nations system has overall purpose: 
maintenance of international peace and security. A few jurists, notably Professors 
McDougal, Reisman and Tesón, reject this restrictionist premise. They contend 
that the UN has two major purposes, both equally significant; first, the 
maintenance of international peace and security; and second, the protection of 
human rights. Tesón submits "the promotion of human rights is as important a 
purpose in the Charter as is the control of international conflict."*
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This assertion can be rejected by saying that the founders of the United 
Nations in 1945 ( as with the founders of the League of Nations ), in the 
immediate aftermath of a great and ghastly war, were primarily concerned with the 
creation of a global instrument or mechanism for the prevention of war. 
Humanitarian concerns were not taken into account simply because humanitarian 
law as a comprehensive and complete legal institution did not exist at that time. 
In addition to this, the USSR, as one of the main founders of the UN itself, was 
a country where the violations of human rights were at such a high level that, 
using the words of Oppenheim, they could "shock the conscience of mankind".
On the other hand, none would contest the fact that every substantial change 
in the global international system inevitably leads to changes in the ideology and 
established institutions of the system. In the given case, the role of the United 
Nations has changed profoundly since 1945, and the same thing has happened with 
the Charter. Particularly, some provisions of the Charter, that were shadowed 
before by Article 2(4). have occupied a very important place within the 
contemporary legal system. For example, it can be argued that among the purposes 
of the United Nations, the purpose "of promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms" (Article 1(3)) is no longer some kind 
of secondary purpose , but is a fundamental purpose of the United Nations.
The recognition of the principle of human rights as a principle of 
international law is another indicator. Thus, it is obvious that the principle of
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human rights is strictly placed among the main fundamental sources of 
contemporary international law. In favor of it Vladimir Kartashkin puts forward 
some arguments. "Decisions of the Security Council to apply sanctions to stop 
criminal human rights violations are binding on all members. Article VI of the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid explicitly emphasizes the obligations of states to carry out the Security 
Council’s decisions aimed at eliminating apartheid. A number of international 
agreements provide for the creation of special bodies that monitor the compliance 
of states with commitments they undertake in the field of human rights protection"^ 
In connection with these statements, it seems reasonable to mention that the 
branch of international law concerning human rights occupies quite a specific 
position among two legal systems: international and domestic. On the one hand, 
the law of human rights is an inseparable part of international law. On the other 
hand, the rights of individuals are a matter of domestic legislation, primarily 
constitutional, thus expressing a high level concern by states on this matter. To 
some extent, the roots of this duality lie in the long-term discussion of whether the 
individual should be recognized as an object or a subject of international law. If 
the individual was simply an object of international law. as before 1945, the 
position of the individual has changed considerably in the post-Second World War 
era. No longer are individuals seen as rightless objects of international law with 
no procedural capacity, rather, they are seen as the bearers of rights and
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correlative duties within the context of the international le^al svstem. 10
Thus, it is reasonable to ask why the subjects of international law should 
obey one norm, such as non-use of force or non-intervention, when, at the same 
time, they can ignore other imperative norms. It should be noted here that the 
above-mentioned collision of norms is one of the weakest aspects of the defence 
of the "restrictionist view".
On the other hand, the Charter’s references to human rights are weak and 
extremely general. Besides Article 1(3) and the Preamble’s expression of 
determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights", the only other 
major substantive references to human rights are in Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter. In Article 55, the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms" is reaffirmed. In .Article 56, members 
"pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization" for this purpose. No powers of coercive enforcement are granted, 
either explicitly, or implicitly." Thus, the first argument of the defenders of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention has failed to overcome the restrictions 
imposed by the provisions of the Articles 2(4) and 2(7).
As a result, the attention of these scholars has been focused on the last 
sentence of Article 2(7), that provided that "this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." According to the 
provisions of the Chapter VII, the enforcement measures authorized by the
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Security Council in cases of "any threat to tlie peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression" are legal and permitted. Thus, following these presumptions some 
supporters of humanitarian intervention supposed that if to recognize violations of 
human rights within a state constitutes an actual threat to the peace or breach of 
the peace, the United Nations can legally intervene in order to stop human rights 
violations. The term "act of aggression" has been clearly identified in the various 
sources of international law. *
However, the question of recognizing human rights violations (of course, 
in its the most severe manifestations) as a threat to the peace is not a question 
which addresses the norms of international law: rather it is a question of 
ideological and political character, the answer to which depends on existing 
conditions. Thus, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghali 
largely sought to base his case for assistance to failed states on the responsibility 
of the United Nations under its Charter to "maintain international peace and 
security". But, the UN’s responsibility for international peace and security is not, 
a sufficient basis for its action to resurrect all failed or failing states because not 
all failed states pose a true danger to peace.'· Therefore, the weakness of this 
argument seems obvious.
The third argument of the defenders of humanitarian intervention relies 
upon a literal interpretation of the Article 2(4) prohibitions. Particularly, it has 
been argued that the legal content of Article 2(4) prohibits the "threat or use of
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force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". Thus, 
any kind of intervention that does not have the purpose of damaging territorial 
integrity, does not represent a threat to the political independence of a state, has 
a short-term character and its purpose is the protection of human rights, does not 
contradict the provisions of the Charter. According to Tesón, "a genuine 
humanitarian intervention does not result in territorial conquest or political 
subjugation".'^ Reisman and McDougal contend:
" Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor 
a challenge to the political independence of the state involved and is not only not 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations but is rather in conformity 
with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it is a distortion 
to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).'"·*
On the other hand, reference to territorial integrity or political independence 
does not explicitly permit humanitarian intervention either. The travaiLX 
préparatoires clearly indicate that this phrase was added at the request of the 
smaller states in order to strengthen the prohibition on the use of force rather than 
to allow an exception to the general rule. In addition, if human rights violations 
are sufficient to justify a military response, it is hard to imagine a remedy short 
of toppling the regime in power, which would seem to be intervention. This 
double-edged argument might show that this would not be essentially a violation 
of political independence - but only at the cost of opening a pandora’s box of
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deceptive, self-justifying arguments. In any case, military intervention is a clear 
violation of a state’s territorial integrity.''’
But the legal framework of the United Nations is applicable to and deals 
only with rightful subjects of international law such as states. The question is how 
to deal with such subjects of international law that juridically are states, but do not 
actually have the characteristic features of a state. For example, such named 
"failed states" as Somalia or Tadjikistan. Thus, Gerald Helman and Steven Rather 
have defined three groups of states whose survival is threatened: first, there are 
the failed states like Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, and Somalia, a small group of 
whose governmental structures have been overwhelmed by circumstances; second, 
there are the failing states like Ethiopia, Georgia, and Zaire, where collapse is not 
imminent but could occur within several years; and third, there are some newly 
independent states in the territories formerly known as Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, whose viability is difficult to assess."’
The main characteristic of a failed state can be identified as follows: firstly, 
the absence of a unified government that is unanimously recognized within the 
society and outside by the international community and that can not ensure a public 
order within a country; secondly, brutal long-termed civil and ethnic strife is an 
inherent feature of a failed state; thirdly, human rights violations, the breakdown 
of food and health systems and economic collapse. The given analysis clearly 
indicates that the probable activity of the international community to save failed
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states is not feasible under the existing legal framework of the United Nations. 
Also, neither the provisions of Chapter VII, nor the provisions of the Chapter XII 
(because, in mostly cases the failed states use a "shield" of sovereignty) are 
sufficient devices.
Although the venerable term sovereignty continues to be used in 
international legal practice, its connotation in modern international law is quite 
different. International law still protects sovereignty, but - perhaps not surprisingly 
- it is the people’s sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty. 
Consequently, the term "sovereignty" can not be used as a shield against 
international interference in cases when human lives at stake. One very important 
point that should be mentioned here is that the above-mentioned contemporary 
changes in the content of the term sovereignty also change the cast of characters 
who can violate that sovereignty.'*' It is quite an old-fashioned formula that 
sovereignty is violated when an outside force invades and imposes its will on the 
people.
But what happens to sovereignty in its modern sense when it is not an 
outsider but some home-grown specialist in violence who seizes and purports to 
wield the authority of the government against the wishes of the people, by naked 
power, by putch or by coup, by the usurpation of an election or by those 
systematic corruptions of the electoral process in which almost 100 percent of the 
electorate purportedly votes for the incumbents list?
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It can be said that in modern international law that, sovereignty can be 
violated as effectively by an indigenous as by an outside force and, sovereignty can 
be liberated as much by an indigenous as by an outside force. In these conditions, 
not having a legal "indulgentia" at hand, the practice of the United Nations has 
gone far beyond the limits of the existing legal framework. The activity of the 
United Nations in Kampuchea and Somalia confirms this point. As a result, it can 
be said that the concept of humanitarian intervention is partially recognized as de 
facto, especially in the cases with the failed states. The next step should be its de 
jure recognition.
The last argument in favor of humanitarian intervention is the consideration 
of morality. The ethnic aspect of humanitarian intervention is probably the most 
attractive feature of the concept. Richard Lillich stated that "to require a state to 
sit back and watch the slaughters of innocent people in order to avoid violating 
blanket prohibitions against the use of force is to stress blackletters at the expense 
of far more important values.
Humanitarian intervention thus seems to present a genuine moral dilemma 
in which important and well-established principles conflict so fundamentally that 
reasonable (persons) of good will may disagree about how that conflict is to be 
resolved.'” But morality can be considered not only from the viewpoint of ethical 
norms, but also as a notion that has got legal content. Thus, Brownlie distinguishes 
the considerations of humanitarianism among the sources of international law.
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According to him. references to principles or law of humanitarianism can be found 
in the preambles of various covenants, in the resolutions of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations and also in diplomatic practice. As a classic example, 
Brownlie cites that part of the decision of the International Court of Justice over 
the incident in the Corfu Channel, where the Court refers to the "common and 
strictly recognized principles including the elementary consideration of 
humanism.
Taking into account that considerations of humanitarianism pretend to be 
some kind of a source of international law, the above - mentioned collision of the 
norms prohibiting the tise of force and intervention on one side and the norms of 
human rights protection and promotion has an additional chance to be resolved in 
favor of human rights.
3.3 Permissible Standards of Humanitarian Inter\'ention
The previous analysis of legality of humanitarian intervention within the 
contemporary international system and state practice seems to be sufficient in 
formulating some recommendations that can be tised in further evaluation and 
implementation of the concept in international practice. Thus. Rodley has put 
forward two main principles, that should be taken into account during any kind of 
collective intervention to protect human rights, particularly, they are the principle
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of necessity and the principle of proportionality."
Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal argue that three basic points should be kept 
in mind when considering outside military intervention. First, it is important to 
have clear short- and long-term political objectives Equally important, these 
objectives must be capable of being translated into realizable military goals. 
Second, the intervention needs to have a credible and sustainable source of 
legitimacy. Third, the intervening force must satisfy operational requirements in 
terms of logistics, command and control and training, that will ensure success in 
the field.'·’
Brownlie formulated five more standards of humanitarian intervention;
- an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights, 
particularly a threat of widespread loss of human life;
- a proportional use of force which does not threaten a greater destruction 
of values than the human rights at stake;
- a minimal effect on authority structures;
- a prompt disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action;
- immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional 
organizations."'*
Other authors insist on adding to these standards such a factor as an 
invitation by the recognized government.
Obviously, some of these ideas can be heavily criticized for many reasons.
41
For example, the idea of an invitation by the recognized government does not take 
into account the cases when a target state does not exist in reality as a centralized 
state entity, where more than one government exist on its territory, or the 
recognized government does not have ability to realize its tasks. Consequently, 
waiting for an invitation can be longlasting. Also, it seems reasonable to change 
fifth standard of Brownlie from immediate full reporting to the Security Council 
and appropriate regional organization to the formulation of authorization by the 
Security Council or an appropriate regional organization.
On the basis of the given considerations, five recommendations can be 
suggested here:
- the principle of necessity
- the principle of proportionality
- a minimal effect on authority structures
- a prompt disengagement
- authorization by the Security Council or appropriate regional organization.
Due to the blurred nature of the first two standards, it is necessary to dwell
on them. Generally, the principle of necessity dictates that no measures short of 
armed force should be available to achieve the lawful objective. Concerning the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, the principle dictates that nothing short of 
the application of armed force would be sufficient to stop the human rights 
violations in question. This means that, except where delay would permit massive,
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irreparable harm, ail measures short of armed force should be exploited before a 
resort to such force.-" Thus, during the decision-making process for humanitarian 
intervention, answers to two questions should be established: Whether a situation 
in a target state demonstrates such a level of human rights violations that require 
the involvement of outside international actors; and whether all measures short of 
armed force, such as investigation, offers of conciliation or mediation, adoption 
of resolutions expressing concern, condemnation, measures provided by the 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and offers of peacekeeping, were used in order to 
stop human rights violations?
It has been noted above that humanitarian intervention can take place only 
in such situations where human rights violations can be generally characterized by 
the words "shocking the conscience of mankind". Also, it has been emphasized 
that such a definition of human rights violations is too unclear and does not consist 
of clearly-defined criteria. On the other hand, it is obvious that the level of human 
rights violations can not be measured by the number of people illegally imprisoned 
or murdered. This is a matter of the comprehensive analysis of a situation in a 
eiven state that should take into account both internal and international factors. 
Moreover, those historical examples considered in the previous chapter clearly 
demonstrate the feasibility of the task of finding a threshold for humanitarian 
intervention. Finally, it should be mentioned that a whole array of various 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations are concerned with
43
human rights protection and promotion. In any case, comprehensive information 
about human rights violations from all parts of the world is already at hand.
Since the just war period, proportionality has required an assessment as to 
whether the overall evil a war would cause would be balanced by the good that 
would be achieved.'^ The principle of proportionality ensures that the gravity and 
extent of violations be on a level commensurate with the reasonably calculable loss 
of life, destruction of property, expenditure of resources and shock to the 
international body politic inherent in the violation of a state’s frontiers.·’ This 
presumably means that a central feature of the situation will be widespread 
violation of the right to life.
The Somali Case:
The principle of proportionality has implications lor, firstly, the selection 
of short and long-term objectives of an intervention and, secondly, the selection 
of the appropriate coercive measures to given conditions. The correct selection of 
the short and long-term objectives of any action is one of the most important tasks. 
Humanitarian intervention in Somalia has clearly demonstrated this point. With the 
ousting of President Said Barre in January of 1991. Somalia was plunged deeper 
into civil strife as rival factions struggled for control.
It was pointed out that the most challenging aspect of the Somali crisis has 
been Somalia’s clan-based political culture. Somalis are 99 percent Muslim and
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share common ethnic origins, so clans are not, for the most parts, religiously or 
ethnically based. The brutal civil strife and the destruction of any manifestation of 
a public order brought disastrous consequences for Somalians. Much of Somalia 
starved. At the peak of the famine, in August 1992, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross estimated that 4.5 million Somalians were, to varying degrees, 
going hungry. According to figures from the UN World Food Programme, one 
half of the people in the country’s south-central region, more that 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  
people had perished by December 1992. In a country with a population of 7 
million, the death toll climbed above one million.
At the urging of the Secretary-General Ghali, the United Nations began 
providing humanitarian assistance to the Somalian people. Unfortunately, it became 
increasingly difficult for the organization to assure that the assistance was reaching 
the individuals in need as warring groups prevented the delivery of food and other 
items. In November 1992, the US offered to provide troops to ensure that 
humanitarian aid would reach its target. The exact mix of motives that prompted 
George Bush to launch the Somali intervention is still not altogether clear. The 
immediate causes were, of course, the ghastly TV pictures of famine from that 
country and the UN Secretary-General’s pleas for help to get food pass the guns
of armed gangs into the hands of the starving. 2K
In response to this request, the Secretary-General recommended that the UN 
accept the US offer. As a consequence, on December 3, 1992, the Security
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Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794. In this resolution, the Council 
"welcomed the offer by a member state... concerning the establishment of an 
operation to create such a secure environment". The Council went on to declare 
that it was "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter " and accordingly, 
"authorized the Secretary-General and member states cooperating to implement the 
offer referred to... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in S o m alia" .B u t, after 
Aidid’s forces (leader of one of the strongest rival fractions in Somalia) ambushed 
Pakistani troops, killing 24 in early June, the situation changed rapidly. The 
Security Council responded with a resolution authorizing the "arrest and detention 
for prosecution, trial and punishment" of those responsible. From this moment the 
humanitarian mission turned into a mini-war against Aidid.·^ ^^
It can be said that the territory of Somalia has played the role of some kind 
of experimentation ground for various operations, such as humanitarian assistance, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and even nation-building. And the provisions of the 
principle of proportionality were not taken into account.
The Kurdish Case in Northern Iraq:
Selection of appropriate coercive measures also requires close attention. In 
every case, a whole range of coercive measures, from coercive measures short of 
armed force such as economic or military embargoes to military operations, should
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be considered during the decision-making process. Particularly, the UN operations 
in northern Iraq clearly demonstrated this point.
Following the conclusion of the Gulf War, an uprising of Kurds in northern 
Iraq was suppressed by forces loyal to the government of Saddam Hussein. This 
led to the flight of the Kurdish population toward Iraq’s border with Turkey and 
Iran. Approximately 7 0 0 ,0 0 0  Kurds entered Turkish territory. Upon the request 
of the Turkish government, it was decided to establish protected areas within Iraq 
to enable the Kurds to return in safety to their homes, where a relief effort could 
be more readily organized.''
The Security Council observing those events on 5 April 1991 adopted 
resolution 688, stating:
The Security Council, mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the 
Charter on the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi population in many parts of Iraq... 
the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the 
region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contributor to removing the threat to 
international peace and security in the region, immediately end this 
repression...;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian
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organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to 
make available all necessary facilities for their operations.
In order to prevent further Iraqi retribution and to stop the flow of refugees, 
Washington had instructed the Iraqi government not to send military forces north 
of the 36th parallel. This was an absolutely new approach in the resolution of such 
situations, and what is more, the latest implementation in Yugoslavia of a similar 
approach (particularly, the creation of so called "safe areas" around Sarajevo, 
Goradje and other towns) demonstrated its effectiveness. On 16 April, George 
Bush announced that
"Consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 688 and working 
closely with the United Nations and other international organizations and 
our European partners. I have directed the US military to begin immediately 
to establish several encampments in northern Iraq where relief supplies for 
these refugees will be made availableie in large quantities and distributed 
in an orderly manner."'·’
Another part of the operations concerned with the Kurdish refugee problem 
was Operation Provide Comfort, which was devoted to the practical problems of 
relief, including the logistics of helping many refugees in inaccessible areas. The 
mountain areas where the refugees to Turkey had gathered had poor roads, made 
virtually impossible by mud and rain. In these conditions, in April, the Turkish 
government announced that its army would move refugees down from the
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mountains to more accessible and sanitary camps 35 miles inside Turkish borders.
It has been stated that the safe havens concept played the rolé of a precedent 
for future UN operations in similar circumstances. The concept inevitably poses 
a direct challenge to state sovereignty which would have to give up effective 
authority over contested territory. Though the intervention succeeded in easing the 
immediate tragedy facing Kurdish people, preventing a recurrence so far, but it 
has left relations between the Kurds and central governments in Iraq and Turkey 
as uncertain as ever.
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CONCLUSION
At this extraordinary moment in history, when old approaches and 
ideologies are being challenged, one thing is becoming particularly important - a 
discussion about the use of force and conditions for its legitimate application. As 
has been argued in this thesis, there are two approaches to the dilemma: restrictive 
approach to the use of force in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter; 
and a new approach according to which conditions for the legitimate use of force 
are much broader and include humanitarian intervention, protection of nationals 
abroad, intervention against drug traffic and terrorism, and even intervention 
against illegitimate regimes.
Despite the fact that almost all kinds of interventions were more or less 
realized through international practice, humanitarian intervention as a theoretical 
concept and, to some extent, legal institution, plays a special role and has high 
significance. This point can be supported by the arguments that are considered in 
this thesis and which could be listed as follows;
Humanitarian intervention has a legal content, based on the main sources 
of international law such as the fundamental principles of international law, the 
Charter of the UN. international treaties on human rights from the Universal
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Declaration on Human Rights to the Vienna Declaration (1993). customary 
international law, decisions of ICJ and resolutions of international governmental 
organizations.
International practice goes more in the direction of broader recognition of 
humanitarian intervention. Although the cases of humanitarian intervention are few 
in number, it can be stated that almost every case of human rights violations (in 
its the most brutal manifestations) within a territorial state was not left without 
close attention and reaction of the international community. At the same time a 
level of international reaction, as well as reaction of individual states was broadly 
varying from expressing protests to forcible interferences into domestic affairs. It 
seems that the main reason of such a differentiation is states’ self-interest foreign 
policies.
Public opinion, world leaders and scholars are moving from previous 
complacent positions to being in favor of humanitarian intervention. Former 
Secretary-General of the UN Perez de Cuellar and the present Secretary-General 
Ghali clearly demonstrated their sympathy for humanitarian intervention.
The recent events in former Yugoslavia characterized by the widespread 
crimes against humanity (for example, the massacre in Stupni Do) have 
demonstrated what can happen if the international community further pursues an 
indecisive policy of non-intervention, following the terms of sovereignty and non­
intervention.
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However, international law (and the world politics)still manifests an 
unresolved tension between the primacy of state sovereignty and growing 
international concern for human rights violations. The attempt of the Security 
Council of the UN to legitimize humanitarian intervention concept through 
establishing a linkage between human rights violations and a threat to the peace 
was not sufficient enough. Although the Security Council Resolution 688 is a step 
forward in this regard, since it represents a clear statement of the linkage between 
human rights violations within a state and authoritative international action it did 
not provide legal basis for UN humanitarian operations.
Despite my sympathy for the concept of humanitarian intervention as 
expressed in the thesis. I understand that, though there are undeniable arguments 
for humanitarian intervention, there are also arguments against it. And, probably 
the main counter-argument lies in the field of international law. The point is that 
rightful recognition of humanitarian intervention as a legal institution will 
inevitably lead to the necessity of revising the fundamental principles and norms 
of international law and that can lead to considerable destabilization of the 
contemporary international system. However, no one today argues against the 
legitimacy of the UN peacekeeping or peacemaking operations (which had not been 
directly provided for in the Charter). Thus, as well as, in case of peacekeeping 
there is a necessary basis for resorting to humanitarian intervention in truly 
exceptional circumstances where there is a real international consensus. But, this
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policy should be implemented without redrafting the existing norms. On the other 
hand it is becoming more and more obvious that contemporary international law, 
the progressive basis of which was founded right after the second World War, 
might not be the most appropriate instrument and after all might remain short in 
meeting the radical demands of the times.
Thus, future humanitarian interventions will inevitably have ad hoc 
character and a comprehensive international system (with a power to fulfil its 
objectives) of promoting and protecting human rights will not be established. It 
should be recognized that even ad hoc humanitarian interventions will be heavily 
criticized by the defenders of "restrictionist view". The only way to avoid their 
criticism is to follow to some mostly recognized standards of humanitarian 
intervention, particularly: authorization by the UN Security Council, principle of 
necessity, principle of proportionality, a minimal effect on authority structures, a 
prompt disengagement.
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